Rousseau's Argument
The Second Discourse, arguably the most intellectually powerful of Rousseau's works, seeks to explain the origins and foundations of human inequality. Its power stems from the brilliance of its analytic method, which distinguishes the human being within society from the one raised without. Natural man in the Second Discourse is a hypothetical construct. Elsewhere Rousseau seems ambivalent about the reality of his natural man, writing as if there were, somewhere, a visitable tribe of noble savages. The Second Discourse however is fairly clear in its goals: to describe the nature of this hypothetical natural man in order to comprehend the variety, and hence malleability, of extant society. As the preface states, the goal is To separate what is original from what is artificial in the present state of man, and to know correctly a state which no longer exists, which probably never will exist, and about which it is nevertheless necessary to have precise notions in order to judge our present state correctly. The point of the Second Discourse is to describe what such an "original" human soul would look like; why it would choose to enter society-although this is really a secondary concern, since the humans Rousseau knew were social animals; and the way it changes in society. Again, the empirical validity of this historical account is irrelevant; Rousseau presents it only to argue for a certain view of a very real social inequality. "The researches which can be undertaken concerning this subject must not be taken for historical truths, but only for hypothetical and conditional reasonings better suited to clarify the nature of things than to show their true origin" (1964:103). And although parts of the historical account are somewhat fuzzy, that account should be spelled out to clarify its appeal for LeviStrauss.
Still in the preface, Rousseau essentially defines the natural human by asserting that human beings have two qualities which do not depend on reason (which he will define as a social product). These two principles or qualities he calls self-preservation and compassion. The former had been a commonplace of political thought at least since Hobbes. The latter Rousseau declared "a natural repugnance to see any sensitive being perish or suffer, particularly our fellow men" (1964:95). This second principle is quite important. Human beings in the presocial state of nature are not self-aware; they do not think about themselves as Each one began to look at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a value. . . . From these first preferences were born on the one hand vanity and contempt, on the other shame and envy; and the fermentation caused by these new leavens eventually produced compounds fatal to happiness and innocence. [1964:149] From social self-awareness stems the destruction of the state of nature.
Rousseau is making a claim far more profound than that envy and vanity are bad feelings which corrupt. He is claiming that the socialized human being has fundamentally altered his very way of thought, that he thinks through objects and through others rather than in himself.
The savage lives within himself; the social man, always outside of himself, knows only how to live in the opinion of others; and it is, so to speak, from their judgement alone that he draws the sentiment of his own existence. [ 1964:179] Humans no longer identify with each other; they see themselves as distinctive but defined through their relationships with others. The impulses of humans in the state of nature remain, but they are much muted.
His fellow man can be murdered with impunity right under his window; he only has to put his hands over his ears and argue with himself a bit to prevent nature, which revolts within him, from identifying him with the man who is being assassinated. In a state of nature, any human being would identify with the dying man; he has no capacity even to conceive of himself as distinct from his fellows. Humans in society see themselves as distinct from the people around them; their whole mode of thinking is to elaborate and manipulate that difference. They can deny the compassionate identification with another in pain.
Reason in the Second Discourse is for the most part a linguistic phenomenon, and for much of the essay Rousseau describes language-albeit in a loose, metaphorical sense-as the primary mechanism that alters the very thought of socialized humans, and enables them to conceive of themselves as different from each other.2 Rousseau gives an elaborate account of the emergence of languages, from cries and grunts laden with affective meaning, to individual objects named each with their own names, to generalizing, abstract words that refer to classes of objects and relations between things. Language becomes riddled with words that have meaning only in a social context--"power," "prestige," "reputation"-and these are the words that define the individual. In society, humans name themselves, and by naming themselves differentiate them from their fellows. They come to understand themselves as having value only through the gradations of unequal difference that set them uniquely apart.
Levi-Strauss
Most anthropologists are familiar with the main thrust of Levi-Straussian analysis; however, it is worth depicting briefly here to indicate the nature of the debt Levi-Strauss describes. Levi-Strauss places more direct weight upon language than does Rousseau, but attributes his understanding to the earlier thinker. He too constructs a state-of-nature human-although his human is somewhat less hypothetical-and also for him, the challenge is to explain how this presocial human is socialized, and the way in which that alters her. As for Rousseau, the presocial human is transformed in society through a process that alters the very form and mode of her thought, and for Levi-Strauss the best way to describe this process is to identify it through language.3 To him "the process of language reproduces, in its way and on its plane, the process of humanity" (1976:38). He claims to have learned this lesson from Rousseau (1976:38).
Scholars commonly describe Rousseau's state-of-nature human as a child.4 Levi-Strauss's is explicitly a child, but a child prior to at least self-conscious thought and to the beliefs, attitudes, and styles that we call cultural. Unlike Rousseau, L6vi-Strauss has a fairly specific genetic epistemology. The child is not entirely mentally formless and thoughtless; and all thought operates through the process of using categories and thus making distinctions. However, the child does not think with clear-cut categories and, in particular, with definite ideas about herself in relation to other people. These clear categorizations emerge only through the process of being a human-in-society.
Each type of social organization represents a choice, which the group imposes and perpetuates. In comparison with adult thought, which has chosen and rejected as the group has required, the child's thought is a sort of substratum, the crystallizations of which have not yet occurred. [1969:93] It is as if Levi-Strauss conceives of a fine net of interconnected categories and distinctions that filters the action of an amorphous individual mind, and thus with a collective net controls the patterns in which an individual's thought could move.
The main thrust of Levi-Straussian epistemology is to assert that thought takes place in categories and that categories and distinctions distort the "true" nature of the object of thought. He does not particularly care about the content of the categories themselves: what bothers him is that the process of thinking demands making distinctions, and distinctions distort. We see an object with a flat surface and four legs; we call it a table. The use of the word "table" to identify the object limits its use and distorts its essence: the object becomes defined as not a chair, not a stool, not a stepladder. In all but one case, he says-when thought takes itself as an object-objects do not exist in themselves for language-using humans, but only in relation to other objects. Ricoeur calls Levi-Straussian philosophy Kantism without a transcendental subject, a description which LeviStrauss applauds (Levi-Strauss 1975:11). It is an apt phrase, for like Kant L6vi-Strauss asserts that the world is seen through prestructuring spectacles. Nothing is seen as it is, but only as it is conceptually constructed in relation to other objects against which its name contrasts it. And thought depends upon language and thus upon the particular categories that a particular culture singles out. This perspective certainly shadows Rousseau's conception of the socially created self-awareness that arises from the individual's awareness of his difference from other in-dividuals. However, Levi-Strauss uses his argument to move toward a goal quite different from Rousseau's.
Rousseau's Use of His Argument
Rousseau's analysis of the transformation of the natural human enabled him to make the political argument for which he is most widely known, and about which he probably cared most deeply.5 If society radically transforms human nature, then the nature of the social animal depends utterly upon the nature of the society into which she is born. "I had come to see that everything was radically connected with politics, and that, however one proceeded, no people would be other than the nature of its government made it" (Rousseau n.d.:417). The social interaction that produces language creates also the network of rights and responsibilities which create political expectations; because it creates property it creates the inequality which is the topic of the Second Discourse, and the oppression, degradation, and poverty that Rousseau decrys as the consequence of his own social world. In 18th-century French society "we have only a deceitful and frivolous exterior, honor without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness" (1964:180).
Despite his despair at his own society Rousseau is a political optimist. The Social Contract aims to determine "any legitimate and sane form of government, taking men as they are and laws as they might be" (1968:49). Law creates morals, customs, and belief-social products, although we think them so natural-and these create the participants in the social whole (1968:99-100). The legitimate and effective society is that in which laws are chosen justly. Rousseau argues that if lawgivers and lawfollowers together create and accept laws that promote the common good of all, then their society is morally just. 'The social part, far from destroying natural equality, substitutes, on the contrary, a moral and lawful equality for whatever physical inequality that nature may have imposed upon mankind" (1968:68).
Under these conditions humans are actually better off in society than in a state of nature. Rousseau introduces one example of this better state in the Second Discourse, when self-conscious notions of morality-absent in a state of naturehave been introduced into the social world, and humans follow their laws willingly out of wisdom. That social world exists before the lust for property and superiority have induced the corruption of society and created profound inequality (1964:150-151). Society as Rousseau knew it corrupts; but socialization has the potential to create humans who achieve far greater moral heights than in the state of nature. And for Rousseau, true freedom arises in a legitimately governed society, where no individual suffers unduly for the benefit of others, but where each life gains through the acceptance of constraints. Emile must be educated outside 18th-century French society, but the purpose of doing so is not to turn him into a noble savage but into a civilian.6
Levi-Strauss's Use of the Argument Levi-Strauss writes at times as if he were seeking a Rousseauian political solution to the ills that plague humanity. For instance:
By bringing out the characteristics common to the majority of human societies [anthropological comparison] helps us to postulate a type of which no society is a faithful realization, but which indicates the direction that the investigation ought to follow. [1974:445] He continues the discussion to argue that anthropology ought to provide us with a vantage point from which we can properly analyze and perhaps reform our social construct. This is Rousseau's goal, and Levi-Strauss quotes it twice within his own "confessions": the search for a state which "no longer exists, which perhaps has never existed, but of which it is nevertheless essential to have a sound conception" in order to judge ourselves (1974:357, 447). But while Rousseau actively constructed a political ideal and an educational program, Levi-Strauss retreats. He writes, admittedly, in a different political world than that of prerevolutionary France. He is strikingly apolitical nonetheless.
To achieve his stated political aims, L6vi-Strauss should produce an elaborate model of social relations that we could use pragmatically to rebuild our lives. When he found the Nambikwara he was supposedly searching for a representative of Rousseau's state of nature. He found and recognized his simple society. But, he claimed, it had no constitutive political structure.
I had been looking for a society reduced to its simplest expression. That of the Nambikwara was so truly simple that all I could find in it was human beings. [1974:358] And with this he abandons his search.
The explanation for abandoning the search is unconvincing. The nomadic nature of the Nambikwara made their division into groups nomadically essential. But, says Levi-Strauss, the choice to lead a group is individual and inborn. It is a personal decision, not an imposition by the group.
In the initial community there are men who are recognized as leaders: it is they who form the nucleus around which the groups assemble. . . . Political power does not appear to result from the needs of the community; it is the group rather which owes its form, size and even origin to the potential chief who was there before it came into being. [1974:347] The crucial impulse for centralized power comes from individuals, not from the collective order that they create.7 The only constitutive elements of government are the governed individuals. And Ldvi-Strauss is not compelled to explore the social construction of the personality or the group dynamics that create a personal drive for power. He does not provide an abstract skeleton on the order of his model of the constitutive properties of thought. But the problem seems one of inclination, rather than inherent difficulty. Ultimately, governmental institutions are interesting to Levi-Strauss only as they reflect the social whole, the "totality" of organizationally connected social action that forms the anthropological subject (1967:362). He is not interested in government itself, or even in the psychological material of the individuals who create it. L6vi-Strauss does, however, use the argument about the transformation of nature into culture in order to describe an anthropological epistemology. Levi-Strauss remarks that Rousseau radically violated Western philosophy. Cartesian philosophy sought certainty and declared that at the limits of skepticism one cannot doubt the doubting: from the self-"I think"-one establishes that the external world (which includes the self) exists.
Rousseau-according
to L6vi-Strauss-discovered from cognitive self-consciousness not so much that there was an external world, but that society alters our perception of it.
Descartes believes that he proceeds directly from a man's interiority to the exteriorization of the world, without seeing that societies, civilization-in other words, worlds of menplace themselves between the two extremes. [1976:36] One never sees the external world directly; one has no real certainty of its nature. The one thing about which we can be certain is that self-awareness depends upon a social whole.
To Yet Levi-Strauss has something more specific in mind that the mere reportage of difference. The implications of Rousseau's anti-Cartesian philosophy (according to Levi-Strauss) is that the truly knowable and objective fact about the world is that thought takes place in categories. What truly excites Levi-Strauss is the use of the anthropological process to discover and to specify these categories.
The methodological rules which [the anthropologist] will have to evoke in order to translate these systems in terms of his own system, and vice versa, will reveal a pattern of basic and universal laws; this is a supreme form of mental gymnastics, in which the exercise of thought, carried to its objective limits . . . exercises every muscle and every joint of the skeleton, thus revealing a general pattern of anatomical structure. [1975:11] We think in categories, and the very fact that we are ethnocentric, that we are caught within them, reveals their reality. Levi-Strauss writes and practices as if we are able to grasp the alien thought of another culture; this belief is essential to the anthropologist's trade. But in the last instance, it does not matter whether the thoughts of the Bororo take place in his mind or his thought or in theirs, because the only fact that is truly knowable, and the only truth that really matters, is that both are couched in categories.
Anthropologists-from this perspective-best recognize this shared constitutive structure precisely because they cannot fully comprehend their fellows. If Westerners see the world through rosy lenses and the Bororo see theirs through blue, the world is tinted purple to the anthropologist. His own mixed perception is his most important data. In Levi-Straussian anthropology knowledge takes itself as its own object; it is, again, "Kantism," because it seeks to understand the limitations of our thought. No anthropologist can be sure of the content of his thought; his split between noumena and phenomena, external reality and reality perceived, is as real in his own world as in his perception of his native's experience. He can no more understand the native appreciation of a myth than he can view his desktop without his spatial perceptions. But in his frustration with the content of the myth he can at least appreciate its familiar form, that the myth itself has an internal structure. The anthropologist's self-reflexive subjectivity-his treatment of thought as a "thing among things"-allows him to see that thought itself has structure. To Levi-Strauss anthropology has a deeper epistemological reality than the natural sciences, because while the sciences build models of an unknowable reality anthropologists build models of themselves. An atom is postulated reality; a category, regardless of its content, is a fact. The message is determinedly argued throughout his corpus, but perhaps most powerfully stated in the "Overture" to The Raw and the Cooked, his philosophical account of his methods and aims. And again, he attributes this philosophical methodology to Rousseau (see Levi-Strauss 1976:33-43).
Classification is the essence of society. Levi-Strauss in fact searches for wider similarities in the content of the distinctions humans make within their worlds; Mythologiques is one product of this quest, an attempt to display the subtle similarities within a huge mythological corpus. But despite the attempt, in the end the tension between being caught within our categories and striving to see the world in terms of others is relieved, for him, with the belief that the only important claim is that the categories, as structuring form, exist. How can we comprehend another's culture, when we are caught within the conceptual categories of our own? How may we reconcile values and objectivity? The Levi-Straussian answer is that we cannot, and that the anthropologist should not try. Her job is that of the philosopher: to understand how we think, rather than what we should. The paragraph reveals that identification-the compassion of Rousseau's natural man-is morally and epistemologically central to Levi-Strauss. Identification forms the "real principle" of the human sciences for through it, as anthropologists, we reveal the classifying bonds that chain us. But morally, the point is to dissolve them, by identifying with others to lose our selfhood. By so doing we escape the otherwise dangerous and life-destroying course of contemporary society and return to the primitive union with a presocial world. "I is another" to Levi-Strauss in two quite different senses. On the one hand, our language, thought, and our very concept of selfhood are formed by the categories imposed by society. To understand man one must disregard individuality to discover what one shares with men. This is the epistemology that in his tribute he credits to Rousseau.
To gain acceptance of oneself in others (the goal assigned to human knowledge by the ethnologist) one must first deny the self in oneself. To Rousseau we owe the discovery of this principle, the only one on which to base the sciences of man. [1976:36] On the other hand, more profoundly, "I is another" describes an injunction to lose the conceptual shackles that bind us, and to regain through compassion that primitive identification with one's fellow human being. This is what the paragraph of his tribute also credits to Rousseau; and from its placement and its eloquence, it seems more deeply felt.
Levi-Strauss's work is replete with elaborate epistemological argument, the description of the classificatory foundation of universal human thought. But his most personal work, Tristes Tropiques (1974), his "confessions," presents this other, almost mystic, side of his tribute to Rousseau. In Tristes Tropiques LeviStrauss asserts that knowledge destroys the subject of its study. To be known is to be categorized, and every category distorts its content. Meaning is created by demarcating an undifferentiated environment, by naming, defining, classifying. To know the object is to transform it for oneself.
Every effort to understand destroys the object studied in favor of another object of a different nature; this second object requires from us a new effort which destroys it in favor of a third, and so on and so forth until we reach the one lasting presence, the point at which the distinction between meaning and the absence of meaning disappears: the same point from which we began. The logical structures of all societies are equally complex-the polemical burden carried by The Savage Mind. But only moder societies internalize their history, so that it intervenes in experience to block them from themselves. Oppressed by its own civilization Europe suffocates, like some aging animal whose thickening hide has formed an imperishable crust around its body and, by no longer allowing the skin to breathe, is hastening the aging process. [1974:382] Moder society stumbles under the weight of its own history and is dying under the mass of its own intellectual sophistication. This is not the account one expects from a philosopher of the universal structure of human thought. But it is argued with passion.
Rejected and despised by society, Rousseau retreated from Paris on long and solitary country walks. Returning from Menilmontant one evening he stepped into the path of a charging dog, and so great was the impact that it was several hours before he regained consciousness. The passage in Rousseau reads:
The first sensation was a moment of delight. I was conscious of nothing else. In this instant I was being born again, and it seemed as if all I perceived was filled with my frail existence. Entirely taken up by the present, I could remember nothing; I had no distinct notion of myself as a person. [1979:43] Remarkably, tellingly, it is this passage which, in his tribute to Rousseau, LeviStrauss calls a "precious moment": it "gives us access to the very core of his works" (1976:43). A moment of rebirth, before the return of consciousness and its weight of memories, of history-to Levi-Strauss this is the unattainable goal that would bring true happiness. Rousseau describes such happiness: "whenever I recall this feeling I can find nothing to compare with it in all the pleasures that stir our lives" (1979:39).
Reveries of a Solitary Walker, in which this moment is recorded, is a remarkable text. Exiled from society, Rousseau records the power of isolation and the depth of the self in solitude. He writes of his great love of solitude, of the resources of the self, and of the true knowledge and happiness that-forced on us through adversity-comes only from within (1979:52). In their humanity he loves his fellow humans, but as individuals he finds them difficult: "thrown into the whirlpool of life while still a child, I learned from early experience that I was not made for this world" (1979:48). But in his forced renunciation of the world, When men later reduced me to a life of solitude, I found that in isolating me to make me miserable, they had done more for my happiness than I had been able to do myself. In the contemplation of a mineral more beautiful than all our creations; in the scent that can be smelt at the heart of a lily and is more imbued with learning than all our books; or in the brief glance, heavy with patience, serenity and mutual understanding, one can sometimes exchange with a cat. [1974:474] Merge, do not differentiate yourself. Be in the world rather than be knowledgeable of it. It seems odd advice to come from a self-proclaimed scientist. Yet he presents it as a major teaching; and he presents it with greater eloquence and power than he does his epistemology.
Levi-Strauss and Rousseau share more than this one affinity, powerful as it is. Each is a musician and an amateur botanist, and to each these activities appeal because they simultaneously characterize the humanmade play of categories, and yet also subvert them. Levi-Strauss, a failed composer-"if I wasn't able to compose with sounds, perhaps I would be able to do it with meanings" (1978:54)-presents music as an emotional "totality." And yet, like myth, it unfolds along a story line. In fact it is because both are simultaneously sequential and encom- 
